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Watergate’s  Unanswered  Questions:   40
Years of Hindsight
From My Remarks
John W. Dean
INTRODUCTION
The following material has been adapted from my remarks at this
symposium. This is not a transcript of that talk, but rather a few edited
selections of the subjects I addressed. If this material appears a bit
disjointed, that is because this was a question and answer session, and I
have summarized and digested matters that arose. Also, because I am
currently working on a book about the unanswered questions relating to
Watergate, the items I have pulled from my remarks relate more to the
process of writing the book than the content of the book. (Plus,
extemporaneous remarks do not always translate well from the spoken to
the written form.)
A.

Uncovering & Organizing the Conversations
No information is more historically important, nor more fundamental
to understanding Watergate, than the question of how could a political
figure as savvy and intelligent as Richard Nixon make such a mess of his
presidency? It is a question I am trying to answer in my work-in-progress.
The only way to answer this question is to fully and carefully examine what
Nixon did, when he did it and why he did it. Most of that information can
be  found  in  Nixon’s  secretly  recorded  White  House conversations.
I thought at the time I started this book project that nearly all the
important information in these recorded conversations was easily available.
I  assumed  that  as  soon  as  Nixon’s  tapes  had  become  public,  someone  had  
transcribed the material that might be of interest or importance. I was
aware that the Watergate Special Prosecutor Force (WSPF) had transcribed
about eighty conversations, although I soon discovered many of these
transcripts are only portions of conversations and most are not very
accurate since they were merely first drafts. About twenty of the WSPF
transcripts are excellent because they were used in the cover-up trial, so the
parties involved listened to them, heard what they heard, and made
corrections in the transcripts. There are another sixty transcripts prepared
1
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for the WSPF by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) secretaries that are
really only very rough drafts, and almost useless. In addition, historian
Stanley Kutler, in his book Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes,
published only partial transcripts of three hundred and twenty Watergate
related conversations. In total, I found four hundred mostly partially
transcribed conversations relating to Watergate and realized that this is
barely the tip of the iceberg.
To my surprise, no one had ever bothered to assemble a
comprehensive   catalog   of   all   of   Nixon’s   Watergate-related conversations
from June 20, 1972, his first day back at the White House following the
arrests of the burglars at the Watergate, to July 13, 1973, when the plug
was pulled on the taping system after Alex Butterfield informed the Senate
Watergate Committee about its existence. When I completed that
cataloging process I found that there are almost two thousand Nixon
conversations relating to this subject—some very brief while others are
quite long. The audio quality of the conversations varies greatly. Recorded
telephone calls are generally the most audible. Many of the room
conversations are virtually impossible to hear, which means they are almost
impossible to transcribe. Fortunately, the technology has improved since
the Nixon era, so I have been able to take the tapes from the National
Archives and improve their audio quality to some degree. I have digitized
conversations that the National Archives had not yet digitized.
In  short,  my  initial  assumption  that  most  of  Nixon’s  Watergate-related
conversations had been transcribed was very wrong. In fact, these
conversations have been largely ignored, and no one outside the National
Archives staff has ever listened to the bulk of these conversations. To
understand this history these conversations are essential. I have had a team
of graduate students working on the transcripts for over a year and we are
now well beyond the halfway point. There is no way to follow what really
happened, and why, without full transcripts. And, frankly, it is fascinating
what I am discovering.
We  know  the  general  story  regarding  Nixon’s  activities  in  Watergate  
but   we   don’t   know   how   it   unfolded   day-by-day, week-by-week, and then
year-by-year. For his memoir, Nixon had his secretaries transcribe
conversations during the first few weeks after the arrests at the Watergate.
It appears they transcribed about thirty conversations. Yet to understand
how Nixon dealt with Watergate, it is necessary to go far beyond the first
weeks of activity to learn what Nixon was learning, when he was learning
it, and why he was learning it. To understand his actions it is necessary to
appreciate what was provoking him, and what actions he took as he
acquired information.
One   of   the   striking   things   I’ve   learned   is   how   little   information   the  
President was given early on. He was not told some of the most important
information relating to the cover-up by his top aides: White House Chief of
Staff Bob Haldeman and his top domestic policy adviser John Ehrlichman.
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Nixon was not informed of the fact that following the leak of the so-called
Pentagon Papers (a classified study of the origins of the war in Vietnam)
there had been a White House sanctioned break-in   of   Daniel   Ellsberg’s  
psychiatrist’s  office  by  Gordon  Liddy  and  Howard  Hunt  to  get  information  
to discredit Ellsberg for his role in leaking this information, and that two of
the men who were used in the Ellsberg break-in were in the D.C. jail after
being arrested during the Watergate break-in. Not surprisingly, this fact
was a matter of real concern to John Ehrlichman, because he had approved
the Ellsberg break-in, yet he withheld this information from the President.
In fact, the reelection committee, which had authorized the Watergate
break-in, might have been cut loose to fend for themselves had there not
been that link back to the White House. But Nixon was not given this
information for months, and not until after his White House was deeply
involved in a cover-up.
Needless to say, new information is emerging from my transcripts,
and not merely because no one else has transcribed most of these
conversations but also because I hear things that nobody hears. For
example, in October 1972 I visited Henry Petersen, the head of the
Criminal Division at the Justice Department, who informed me that Mark
Felt, the number-two man at the FBI, who we now know was Deep Throat,
was leaking information. A lawyer for Time magazine had informed
Petersen that Felt was leaking and they were concerned they might be
getting grand jury information, which is unlawful. After Petersen shared
this information, I took it back to the White House and told Haldeman, who
in turn reported it to Nixon. Stanley Kutler, in his transcripts of this
October 19, 1972 conversation, did not hear what I heard. At one point
Kutler  has  Nixon  saying  to  Haldeman,  after  being  told  about  Felt’s  leaking,  
“You   know   what   I’d   do   with   him,   the   bastard?”  Kutler’s   transcript   never  
answers the question. But I heard Nixon say something very different, as
have others I have asked to listen to my tapes, which have been scrubbed
with the latest technology. On my copies it is very clear that Nixon said,
“You   know   what   I’d   do   with   him:   Ambassadorship.”   A   huge   difference.    
This is what Nixon would later do with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Director Richard Helms, appointing him ambassador to Iran to move him
out and keep him happy. So I am finding information on these recorded
conversations that others have missed because not only is the technology
better, but because I know the players and the circumstances.
B.

Nixon’s  Grand  Jury  Testimony
While doing research for my work-in-progress at the National
Archives, I rediscovered testimony of Richard Nixon that I had actually
forgotten about, probably because it had been sealed and would, I thought,
never be available. Nixon had testified, after he resigned from office,
before the last Watergate Grand Jury. Because he had been pardoned by
President Ford for any and all of his conduct while President, he had no
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criminal exposure nor could he rely on the Fifth Amendment to not answer
questions. That pardon, however, did not include anything after he had
resigned. Thus, when testifying before a grand jury he risked being
charged with perjury if he was not truthful. At the time Nixon appeared
before the grand jury, the WSPF was still actively investigating a campaign
contribution to Nixon from billionaire Howard Hughes; misuses of the
Internal Revenue Service for political purposes during the Nixon
presidency; the sale of ambassadorships by the Nixon White House; and
the eighteen and a half minute gap on a June 20, 1972 conversation that had
been subpoenaed by the special prosecutor. Under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, grand jury proceedings are secret and these records
typically remain sealed forever. Thus, only a handful of people knew what
Nixon had said when asked about these matters during his testimony, and
they were prohibited by law from revealing this information.
When in Washington doing research, I lamented this fact to a friend,
Alan Morrison, an associate dean at George Washington University School
of Law. Alan asked me if I was aware that the Second Circuit had released
the secret grand jury testimony of Richard Nixon in the Alger Hiss case
during the McCarthy era, as well as grand jury testimony from Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg. I had not been aware, and Alan explained that this grand
jury testimony had been released because of its historical importance. He
said that the chief judge of the federal district court where a grand jury sits
has it within his or her power to release such historic testimony. Alan, who
had been one of the cofounders of the Public Citizen Litigation Group,
thought they might be interested in representing historians interested in
Nixon’s  June  1975  grand  jury  testimony.    I  spoke  with  Stanley  Kutler,  and  
he was very interested in leading this effort, and working with Public
Citizen.    He  assembled  a  who’s  who group of American historians to join
in   a   petition   requesting   the   court   disclosure   of   Nixon’s   grand   jury  
testimony. The action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, and after examining the facts submitted for the interested
historians by Public Citizen, Chief Judge Royce Lamberth unsealed
Nixon’s  grand  jury  testimony.    The  Nixon  Presidential  Library  has  posted  
the material online, and it is revealing.
C.

Mark  Felt’s  (or  Deep  Throat’s)  Misinformation
Mark Felt, who was in charge  of  the  FBI’s  day-to-day investigation of
Watergate, and who we now know was the infamous Deep Throat
(mythologized  by  the  movie  “All  the  President’s  Men”),  is  one  of  the  most  
celebrated leakers in American history. Felt, as the associate director of the
FBI, was the number-two man during Watergate, knew virtually everything
the FBI knew. Indeed, his initials are on countless documents that crossed
his desk during that investigation. For that reason, I find it incredible that
Felt provided a remarkable amount of totally inaccurate information.
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In their book, All  The  President’s  Men, Woodward and Bernstein set
forth the information they learned from Deep Throat. I once had occasion
to gather all that information and was surprised by how much of the
information was bad. More recently, in working on my book, I have
discovered that Felt was providing information that he appears to have
concocted, for it is nowhere to be found in the FBI files. As the Nixonrecorded conversations show, we knew Felt was leaking, and that he was
doing it to undercut the acting FBI Director Patrick Gray. We knew that
Felt wanted the job of FBI director, and he apparently believed that by
leaking, it would show Nixon that Gray could not control the FBI.
Recently, a very able investigative journalist and historian, Max
Holland, has written a terrific book about Mark Felt, Leak: Why Mark Felt
Became Deep Throat, and further confirmed our perception at the time
about   Felt’s   motives.      Watergate   cannot   be   fully   understood   without  
appreciating the issues Max Holland has addressed in his book.
D.

Reforms After Watergate
Watergate caused Washington to reexamine the way it did business,
and that, in turn, provoked many reforms. This is not the time or place to
catalogue those reforms, rather I merely want to point out that most of
those post-Watergate reforms have vanished. A few examples will make
the point. The Senate Watergate Committee recommended, and Congress
approved, the creation of an Independent Counsel Law, a prosecutor who
could investigate a President, Vice President and other high level
officials—and not be fired by the President, as had happened during
Watergate. Congress adopted a number of new campaign finance and
reporting laws and created the Federal Elections Commission. In the
aftermath of Watergate, investigative journalism saw a dramatic increase,
with most every news organization encouraging such reporting. In brief,
new formal and informal restrictions were imposed on presidents; from
controlling their ability to enter wars, to the way they handled their
presidential papers, not to mention how they campaigned for the office.
As  we  approach  Watergate’s  fortieth  anniversary,  I  find  it  striking  that  
virtually all of these post-Watergate reforms have disappeared for one
reason or another. The Independent Counsel Act is gone. Congress
allowed it to expire after both Republicans and Democrats were adversely
affected by the law. Campaign finance reform has been affected by a
number of U.S. Supreme Court rulings, most recently by Citizens United,
which has produced a new flood of money into the 2012 presidential
campaign cycle. The Federal Elections Commission is still in existence,
but it is something of a joke, for this bi-partisan group cannot agree on
anything. Even investigative journalism has become the exception rather
than the norm, because journalism has been changed by the Internet and
investigative journalism is not always profitable.
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Nonetheless, there is a distinctive exception to the disappearance of
the post-Watergate reforms. During my testimony before the Senate
Watergate Committee, I commented about the fact that a disproportionate
number of lawyers found themselves on the wrong side of the law during
Watergate. The American Bar Association (ABA) took note of this fact as
well, and assembled a commission to examine legal ethics and
professionalism.  I  was  told  by  several  involved  in  the  ABA’s  undertaking  
that my testimony had been something of a trigger. In the years following
Watergate, the ABA developed a Model Code of Professional Conduct,
required separate bar examinations on ethics, and created a program for
continuing legal education, which is mandatory in many states. These
ethics and professionalism reforms imposed by organized bars, state by
state in the aftermath of Watergate, have remained very much in place.
They are as important today as they were in the years immediately after
Watergate when the ABA, and state bars, decided they were going to do
something to address the kinds of mistakes attorneys made during
Watergate.
E.

The Watergate CLE
In December of 2010, I received a call from a friend in Cleveland, Jim
Robenalt, who is a partner in the multi-state law firm Thompson Hine. Jim
had just completed a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course that had
examined the tragic shootings at Kent State University on May 4, 1970.
Since this tragedy occurred while I was the Associate Deputy Attorney
General of the United States, he was curious about my recollections, which
were few because I had not been involved with the matter. However, it
provoked a conversation about how typically boring CLE classes can be
made very interesting by drawing on lasting lessons from historic events.
To make a long story short, Jim (a presidential scholar when not practicing
law) and I decided to assemble a CLE based on Watergate.
I had spoken at CLEs for years, and had always been disappointed by
the use made of this history as a teaching tool. Given the fact that so many
attorneys made mistakes during Watergate, there is an abundance of
material from which to draw. Jim Robenalt, who specializes in complex
business litigation, typically represents business entities, and as he began
looking at the rules of professional conduct that emerged from Watergate
(and later Enron), he noticed dramatic changes in the rules of professional
conduct relating to entities. For instance, following Watergate the role of
White House Counsel vis-à-vis the President and the Office of the
President of the United States have been clarified (White House counsel
represents the office, not the person who is elected to the office), and when
we  applied  the  ABA’s  Model  Code  of  Professional  Conduct  to  the  events  
that occurred during Watergate, we discovered very telling results.
To clarify our thinking, we wanted to talk with an expert, and I knew
one who had knowledge of Watergate: Ronald Rotunda. Rotunda had been
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an attorney with the Senate Watergate Committee and with whom I had
spoken about these events several years earlier. Best of all, I discovered
Ron was The Doy and Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of
Jurisprudence at Chapman University School of Law, which was only
about  an  hour’s  drive  from  my  home.    I  called  him,  told  him  what  Jim  and  I  
were doing, and asked if he would walk   me   through   the   ABA’s   Model  
Code in the context of Watergate, and he graciously agreed to do just that,
which helped us focus our attention. Based on information from Professor
Rotunda  and  with  Jim’s  skill  and  experience  as  a  trial  lawyer,  we  narrowed
the program to focus on the first week at the Nixon White House following
the arrests at the Watergate. It was during that week that the die was cast
for the Watergate cover-up, so the mistakes made that week provided a
powerful teaching tool for what an attorney should not do when
representing an entity with a powerful person in charge. More strikingly,
had   the   ABA’s   Model   Code   existed   in   June   1972,   I   sincerely   believe   it  
would have changed history.
Jim and I gave a two-hour edition of The Watergate CLE at Chapman
University School of Law the day before this symposium, with Ron
Rotunda joining us. Working with Ron led not only to the development of
our CLE program, but to this Watergate Symposium, where we have all
had a chance to visit this history. My sincere thanks to Ron, Chapman
University Law School, and the editors of this journal for organizing and
bringing together some of those involved in making this history and
providing the opportunity to examine its meaning for attorneys today.

